

NATIONALISM IN POST-1980 TURKEY:

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO

TRUE PATH PARTY

A Thesis

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
Master of Arts

BY

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
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


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
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ABSTRACT

Turkish political system, experiencing a process of change after World War I, has been deeply influenced by the metamorphosis of the political elite and of the all other political actors. The fact that the metamorphosis is not an ongoing linear process, the breaks that Turkish democracy faced are also the milestones of this change. 1980 military intervention, defining its *raison d'être* as the lack of reconciliation among the politicians, initiated a new phase in Turkish political system. In this context, and in the context of Turkic republics proclaiming their independence one after another, Pan-Turkism and New-Ottomanism being discussed again, and ethnic questions coming to the agenda in Turkey and in the world, this study endeavors to investigate if and to what extent some of the political elite in the True Path Party are subscribed to ethnic rather than territorial nationalism, the latter being the nationalism conception of the Republic of Turkey from its very beginning.

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

1.1) Nationalism

No force has greater influence upon world affairs than nationalism nor is any other so responsible for political action and reaction. The association with one's own nation and the recognition of states other than one's own are fundamental to modern political organization.¹

A nation is a large group of people with or without government, with or without country who believe that they belong together because of certain characteristics that separate them from others.² Nationalism, on the other hand, is a state of mind in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be owed to the nation.³ In other words, nationalism means asserting the primacy of a group affinity based on a language, culture and descent, and sometimes on a common religion and territory as well, over all other claims on a person's loyalty.⁴ As a political doctrine it claims to provide the ideological basis and justification for the right of all the world's people to organize themselves into independent or autonomous entities.⁵

Nationalism is the exaggerated and unjustified tendency to emphasize national interests. Critics condemn it as an outmoded,

deep-seated disease because its generative element is described as egoistic: all those living in a given country belong to one and the same in-group, which is distinct from the out-groups surrounding it. Functioning in a milieu of historical paradox, nationalism is notorious for producing strange myths, which come to be accepted as normal and rational. In these critics can be found the fear of the potential force of nationalism for unity, disruption, independence, fraternity, colonial expansion, aggression, anticolonialism, economic expansion,⁶ in short, undesired change.

1.2) Ethnic and Territorial Dimensions of Nationalism.

1.2.1) Ethnic Nationalism

Nations seek explanation for their character in the past, real or imagined. Frequently, the tie of language is overwhelming, although not always. Germany and Austria are separate countries regardless of their common language, and Switzerland is a multilingual state. Nevertheless, the force of language should not be underestimated. Religion, similarly, often plays a key role, but not always. The Nazis invoked race as a characteristic of nationalism. Their emphasis was extreme, but ethnic identity frequently does affect nationalistic sentiment. However strong other characteristics may be, a perception of a common history and a cultural tradition deriving from it is almost always be an essential element of nationalism.

Cultural nationalism providing the explanation for the character of a nation, is the allegiance of people to the factors which shape their culture, language, religion and a common history.

Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, is an ideological movement on behalf of the autonomy, unity and identity of a human population conceived by some of its members as an actual or potential nation which in turn is defined in terms of a myth of ancestry and historic culture.⁷ It refers to sentiments of belonging and aspirations for the well-being and autonomy of human populations conceived as nations in terms of common cultural traits and historical experiences. In its incidence and political impact, the ethnic variety of nationalism is undoubtedly the most important, given the large number of polyethnic states and the appeal of ascriptive ties and historic cultures.

Explanations of ethnic nationalism fall into two main groups. The so-called 'primordialists' tend to see ethnicity as a given of the human condition and hence the striving for ethno-national autonomy as universal, if not natural. The so-called 'instrumentalists' regard ethnic communities and nations as weak constructs and ethnic perception and national sentiment as situational, the boundaries of belonging and opposition vary with the situation of the perceiver, thus they are manipulable.⁷ According to them, ethnic culture is an instrument

for mobilizing group emotion on behalf of causes used by elites in their competition for wealth and power.

1.2.2) Territorial Nationalism

Nationalism is argued by Yehoshua Arieli as follows: "Nationalism rises beyond loyalties to ancient traditions or the attachment of men to their land, their homes and the localities to which they belong". The territorial dimension of nationalism is, by itself, one of the major effects that shape contemporary nationalism.⁸

Some sharing of space is implicit in any group's occupation or control of a particular piece of territory. Individual membership of the group will be based on a shared identity, or understanding of entitlement to some of what is produced or appropriated collectively.⁹ Particular rivers, mountains and the like can take on deep, even mystical or religious significance in expressing what might have been the harrowing historical experience of surviving the struggle with nature or some hostile competitors for territory.¹⁰

Territoriality is not some innate human trait but a social construct. It can take different forms in different geographical and historical circumstances. It is not sufficient to see territoriality simply as normal and a necessary characteristic of human existence. However, according to one view, man, like the lower animals, is moved instinctively and unconsciously to defend

his own living space. This thesis suggests that when human beings form social groups to defend their title to the land or the sovereignty of their country, they are acting no differently and no less innately from similar motivations in the lower animal world. Thus, nation-state is merely an invention of man to indicate the territory of the in-group.¹¹ Territoriality and its various expressions must be recognized as means to some end, such as, survival, political control or xenophobia.

Territoriality is then, the attempt by an individual or a group to affect, influence or control people, phenomena and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographical area.¹² When this area is called "country", the same attempt is called territorial nationalism.

This nationalism reinforces and reproduces the collective sense of identity of its citizens, an identity that attempts to transcend alternative allegiances¹³ and it can also lead¹⁴ to the notion of common economic interest.

1.2.3) Ethno-Territorial Nationalism

It is probably correct to say that while in the West territorial and ethnic nationalism were combined, as during the French Revolution, in eastern Europe, the Middle East and south Asia, ethnic nationalism has tended to overshadow pure territorial nationalism operating on behalf of units based on

historic or colonial territories. Even in these areas, however, territorial nationalism has sometimes been espoused by sections of intelligentsia and the bureaucracy¹⁵ to grapple with the ideological aspirations and movements of host ethnic communities within the new states.

On the other hand, ethnic groups seek to have a geographical space. For the vindication of the ethnic group it is not always sufficient that a social border be drawn between itself and similar groups. The desire to live together necessitates some limited territory which is very likely to be the country of the group.

The Kulturnation nationalism of German scholars reflects a common heritage of language, tradition, religion, descent (hence race) and world view. Being very close to ethnic nationalism, it is the opposite of the Staatnation nationalism, in which, the reason for unification is based solely upon expedience or logical schemes, is purely political, but not the result of historical evolution. These definitions being ideal types, it is not easy to find a genuine example of nationalism that fits exactly to any one of them. Turkish nationalism is no exception.

1.3) Elite Imposition of Nationalism

Turkish nationalism emerged much later than other nationalisms, and it has been imposed from above, by the elites. The decline of the Ottoman Empire obligated Turkish political elite to take stock of themselves and the system. They blamed Ottomanist policies of the end of the Empire and decided that the only way out was Turkish nationalism. The Party for Union and Progress changed these thoughts to the Turkism ideal which failed catastrophically resulting in the collapse of the Empire. This stage was the stage of cultural nationalism. The founders of Turkish Republic, in consensus on the necessity of a nationalism, created a different one by sharing the cultural part of the first, by adding it modernization, but by rejecting the Turkism ideal. Their nationalism was territorial.

Today, the political elite of Turkey is worth studying concerning their nationalistic attitude. The political elite being a large group, and nationalism generally being found at the right of the spectrum, the True Path Party (TPP), the leading right party, as well as the major partner of the coalition government since October 1991 is the best unit of analysis for this study. The TPP, then selected for the analysis, is also the party which defined itself to be the continuation of the Democratic Party, the mother party of Turkish right.

1.4) Historical Background

To understand the development of Turkish nationalism, it would be better to begin with the question that Turkish nationalists ask themselves very frequently: Why did Ottoman Empire decline from being the giant of its time to "the sick man of Europe"? Religion was the same religion; traditions were to some extent changed because of the decline; race was the least effective factor; and minorities have always had their rights.

Turkish nationalism was a reaction to the decline of the Empire. Before the nationalist and separatist actions of the minorities, Turks opted for Ottomanism.¹⁶ The Ottoman spirit was so internalized by the Turks that, Mithat Pasha had thought about placing a cross near the moon and the star on the flag. At the end of 19th century Turks blamed the system being against them and serving all the groups in the Empire, but the Turks. First the elite and then the young military officers began to emphasize "Turkish nation", adopting the epithet "Young Turks" given to them by the West. Ziya Gökalp, being the godfather of Turkish nationalist thinkers, saw the elite-mass conflict of centuries as the major problem and argued that a common national culture and national consciousness should be created.

The Balkan Wars, 1912, were the real beginning of Turkish nationalism even though the Union and Progress was in government

since the adoption of the Second Constitution, 1908. Türk Yurdu Dergisi, a publication of Turkish Hearths, was, in the early decades of the twentieth century, the journal of well-known intellectuals such as Ziya Gökalp, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Yusuf Akçura, Fuat Köprülü, and Mehmet Emin Yurdakul. Following Ahmed Vefik Pasha, Ali Suavi, Şinasi, and İsmail Gaspıralı, they stressed the importance of language as a factor of national unity. Their ideologist was Ziya Gökalp who was for national religion and cultural nationalism. He criticized the Sharia or Religious Laws and the Islamic dogma which were, for him, the reasons for the decline of the empire. Fuat Köprülü came out with a new perspective of history which was a way of rewriting it for the Turks.

These theses were deeply internalized by the Young Turk government; Turkism became the official ideology of the state and led to the entrance of the Empire to the World War I which brought its demise.

During the National War of Independence, Berthe George-Gaulis wrote that "the most observable characteristic of Turkish nationalism is an absolute self-sacrifice by forgetting its own existence".¹⁷ This war being called national, was not initiated against the Empire. The nationalism emphasis of this war was witnessed at the end of it.

The founders of Turkish Republic, meaning the winners of the war, adopted the mission of reproducing the society. Their major aim was to catch up with the contemporary civilization. For them nationalism was needed as a tool or as a glue to unify the society as well as the land. Misak-ı Milli (the "National Oath")¹⁸ borders were defined territory of the new state; in these borders a new nation would rise. These idealistic aims needed some myths or legends to be realized, and they created them.

The Sun Language Theory, which is one of the most interesting theories for the birth of languages if not the most surprising, argued that Turkish was the first language in the world, and all other languages were derived from it. Leaving aside some serious exaggerations, it is questionable if this theory was strictly necessary for the language reform. The Ottoman which was "infected" by Arabic and Persian, was the major separator between the elite and the masses, if not the only one. To "cleanse" Turkish from these "alien" factors and to purify it, Turkish Language Association was established. The Latin alphabet was another means to modernize the language and to break up the language tie with the Ottoman culture. In addition to all these reforms and with the effect of the rising nationalist-fascist regimes in Europe, the call to prayer was translated into Turkish. This was a period during which Turanism was reincarnated.

A nation without a common history, according to the founders of the Republic, was not a nation. This was very understandable because earlier Turks were not recognized as a privileged nation; they were lacking in self-respect. The history was reviewed by the Turkish History Association with the thesis of the immigration of nations. According to this thesis, Turks immigrated from Central Asia as well as the Indians of North America and the Jews of the Eastern Europe. They are the founders of large states and empires, and their history is full of courage and piety, along with culture and science. It was also argued that the pre-Ottoman glories of the Turk is in Central Asia or on the civilization of the Anatolian Hittites who were claimed to be Turks like many other groups in and around Anatolia.¹⁹ Even though these claims were not accepted by conservative nationalists, they served as tools to break up the historical tie with the Ottoman past. The conservative nationalists, on the other hand, were for a smoother break from the past. The winds of the nostalgic nationalism of Europe²⁰ carried "Turan" back to the agenda in 1940s. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and Zeki Velidi Togan were the leading proponents of this approach; they aimed "to save the Turks who were under the pressure of communism" in the then Soviet Union. Also, according to them Islam had not to be rejected in the definition of nationalism. These conservatism, Turanism, anti-communism and pro-Islam principles are still alive in Turkish politics. The Nationalist Action Party before 1980 and its successor

the Nationalist Work Party, are the inheritors of these principles.

Secularism was by itself the major reform of the Turkish Republic, but it also had a significant impact on the nationalism conception. Ottomanism of the late 19th century and the Pan-Islamism of Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) (two extreme policies on religion - one is for all "religions of the book", the other for only Islam) were dramatically replaced by secularism. This was the major change in Turkish cultural identity, and another break up of the new state from its cultural inheritance.

The nationalism of the founders of the Republic, however, was not only a cultural nationalism. As agreed in the Lausanne Conference (July 24th 1920), Turkish borders were the borders of the new state. Pan-Turkism was out of question. The concept of nationalism was changed to that of encouraging the people of this new state to develop within its own borders. The charismatic leader of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, said, "Happy is he who calls himself a Turk". Also, one of the most characteristic aspects of Republican People's Party (RPP) nationalism was its non-expansionism. In Atatürk's words, "Peace in the country, peace in the world", was the principle of Turkish foreign policy. Misak-ı Milli borders were the borders of Turkish nationalism.

There is no ethnic characteristic in the "official" conception of nationalism. The nationalism of the founders of the Republic was presented as cultural nationalism, but it was territorial rather than cultural.

1.5) The Present Study

Today, with the destruction of many Marxist regimes and the rise of human rights in the world, the ethnic questions are on the agenda. European experiments have shown us that there would be problems in cohabitation. The ethnic and regional cleavages are in the agenda of Turkey, too. For the first time in the country's history a regional party, the People's Work Party, representing the South-East Anatolia has a group in the parliament. The members of this party claim that they are the representatives of the Kurds who were ignored, if not exploited, by the Turks. They argue that the cultural needs of the Kurds and the economic development of the region were neglected. Also a separatist organization, Worker's Party of Kurdistan (PKK), is fighting against the state powers for carving a territory for the Kurds. These problems are discussed on various platforms in Turkey.

The present study aims to investigate if and to what extent the political elite of the leading party in Turkey of the early 1990s subscribe to ethnic rather than territorial nationalism.

Chapter two looks at the political and social power of the political elite in Turkey from the Ottoman times to the present. The reforms that the political elites imposed on society, the reactions of the masses to those reforms, and the effects of this interaction on Turkish political life are discussed in Chapter two. In Chapter three, a brief history of Turkish nationalism and an overview of its development are presented. The origins of Turkish nationalism, ideologies behind different categories of nationalism, their ideologues and people's reactions to different views on nationalism are taken up. Chapter four discusses the political movement which created the TPP, and the nationalism conception behind this movement. Then an analysis of the TPP nationalism is made, viewing its territorial and ethnic dimensions. In the last part of the chapter, the TPP's approach towards the South East Problem of Turkey is discussed. The concluding chapter summarizes the basic points made in this study and offers some conjectures on the future of Turkish nationalism.

The selection of the political elites studied is based on several factors. First of all, the person to be studied should be a prominent member of the party. Second factor is the frequency of his public statements on the present subject matter (nationalism). Thirdly, this person should have a specific and well-defined conceptualization of nationalism. With these limitations, I chose 6 political elites in the TPP. Süleyman Demirel (the Prime Minister and the head of the party),

Hüsamettin Cindoruk (the Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly), İsmet Sezgin(the Minister of Internal Affairs) , Coşkun Kırca (retired ambassador and writer on foreign affairs), Bedrettin Dalan (the former head of the Democratic Center Party which later joined the TPP), and Ayvaz Gökdemir (one of the leaders of the conservative group within the party).

Also for the period covering three months before and after the elections of 21 October 1991, Tercüman (an Istanbul daily) was studied. Tercüman is a rightist newspaper and, calls itself "the newspaper of the common sense"; the Turkish translation of common sense also means the sense of the right.

NOTES

1. Max J. Skidmore, Ideologies: Politics in Action (London: HBJ Inc. 1989), p. 259.
2. Ibid., p. 260.
3. Louis L. Snyder, Encyclopedia of Nationalism (New York: Paragon House, 1990), p.IX.
4. M.A. Riff, ed., Dictionary of Modern Political Ideologies (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1987) p. 154.
5. Ibid., p. 154.
6. Louis L. Snyder, Encyclopedia of Nationalism (New York: Paragon House, 1990), pp. X-XI.
7. Vernon Bogdanor, ed., The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions (Oxford, U.K., Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 208-9.
8. Yehoshua Arieli, Individualism and Nationalism in American Ideology (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), p.1
9. David M. Smith, " Introduction: the Sharing and Dividing a Geographical Space" in Shared Space, Divided Space, Micheal Chisholm and David M. Smith, eds. (London, etc. : Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1990), p.1.
10. Ibid., p.3.
11. Snyder, Encyclopedia of Nationalism , pp. 387-90.
12. R. Sack, Human Territoriality (Cambridge, U.K., Cambridge University Press, 1986) p.19.

13. R.J. Johnston, D.B. Knight and E. Kofman eds., Nationalism, Self-determination and Political Geography (London : Croom Helm, 1988) , p.8.
14. J. Anderson, "Nationalism in a Disunited Kingdom" in The Political Geography of Contemporary Britain, J. Mohan ed. (London: Macmillan, 1989) , p. 36.
15. Bogdanor, ed., The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions , p. 208.
16. Cherished first by the Young Ottomans and later by a group within the Young Turks, this view did not see the national and religious differences among ethnic groups within the Empire as an obstacle to unity, and valued Ottoman patriotism above everything. See Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964).
17. Berthe Georges Gaulis, Kurtuluş Savaşı Sırasında Türk Milliyetçiliği (İstanbul: Rado Yayınları, 1981) p. 17.
18. The compromise of the last Ottoman Parliament, which emphasize the viability of the territories (of the now Turkish Republic) and the necessity of plebiscite in both Western Thrace and Arabian Peninsula , on January 28th , 1920.
19. According to the official history thesis of the period, Kurds, Lazes, Armenians and Greeks are claimed to be of Turkish origin.
20. Turan is the promised land to "Turanian Race" where the

unification of all Turkic nations, including Finns, and Magyars, and Mongols, is expected to materialize.

Chapter Two

POLITICAL ELITE IN TURKISH POLITICAL LIFE

One of the central problems of Turkish politics is and long has been the problem of elitism. By this term I mean the tendency of a small privileged sector to dominate society and, consciously or not, to regard its domination as legitimate and desirable because of the cultural or intellectual inadequacy it attributes to "nonelite" elements. The elite may be primarily self-serving or they may use their power for the welfare of the masses; but the critical points are that the elite actually have highly disproportionate power, and that fundamentally they feel justified to dominate others because of a durable, culturally based disrespect for the capacities of nonelite elements.¹ According to Roderic H. Davison, "there always has been an elite in one form or another [in Ottoman and Turkish society]. It has been the ruling element and the moving element throughout Turkish history.... Without the ruling group,² Turkish history is inexplicable."

2.1 Ottoman Empire

According to Frederick W. Frey, throughout most of the Ottoman Period, the composition of the political elite was remarkably consistent. Four major institutions occupied the

heights of power. These were the military, the bureaucracy, the religious institution, and the court. These institutions dominated the political life³, the recruitment system established during the reign of Mehmet II, who created a governmental system staffed by the slaves of sultan. Earlier, non-Muslims were forcefully converted to Islam, given special training in special schools in Istanbul, forbidden marriage while on active duty, and attached to the person of sultan as his slaves. Later parents increasingly gave up their sons willingly in hopes of a bright future for them since capable boys could rise to the highest ranks of state administration, including the position of grand vezir, chief advisor to the sultan.

To enter the ruling group one needed to know the "Ottoman Way", that is, to have mastered the hybrid language and behavior of Ottomans. This usually required education, either in one of the special schools or else through the education provided by a privileged family background. Thus, education by itself was the major factor in being an elite in Ottoman Empire, and the major dividing line between the ruling group and the ruled.

It follows that a fundamental Ottoman legacy to contemporary Turkey was a political system in which the ruling elite held power. No bourgeoisie, hereditary landed aristocracy, or nongovernmental clergy existed with an independent source of power. Thus, the state and its rulers dominated the society.

From the eighteenth century on, but most conspicuously in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, two distinct groups emerged within the ruling elite, differentiated by their reactions to the decline of the state. One group is usually referred to as the "Westernizers", "modernizers" or "reformers".⁴ It consisted mainly of the young officers who were products of the new Western type of military schools, bureaucrats who had relatively modern education and who frequently had diplomatic contacts with the West, and some members of the intelligentsia such as journalists. For this group, the answer to Ottoman debility was modernization, defeating the European powers at their own game.

The opposed camp consisted of a coalition of "traditionalists." For much of the time, the "spearhead" of the resistance to modernization was a traditional contingent within the military, that is, the janissaries and the lower military personnel. Their reason for opposition was the fear of losing the privileged status that they were used to. Even more influential in the traditionalist cause however, were the clergy. Although the ulema, or the religious dignitaries, were divided among themselves, and although an aristocratic element in its leadership sometimes supported specific modernizing reforms, in general it furnished the ideological justification for opposition.

2.2) Young Turks

The decline of the Empire and the lost wars proved the necessity for modernizing the Ottoman warfare. Western type of military schools were established during the nineteenth century. The specific education these schools offered and the effect of losing of territories to different ethnic groups within the Empire created a new branch of modernizing elites. Their first aim was to stop the dismemberment of the Empire. Following the First Constitutionalist Period (1876-1878), Abdülhamid II exiled most of them. The majority of the rest themselves left the country.

Abdülhamid II renewed government centralization, and expanded communications through telegraph lines and railroads. He expanded and modernized both military and professional education. Doing these he added new members to the modernizing elites. But, he did not pursue Ottomanism; he saw religion and his title of Caliph as the major unifying elements for the people living in Ottoman lands.

Abdülhamid II recognized the potential of the belief held by Europeans that the caliph-sultan could speak on matters of dogma because his authority paralleled that of the Pope. He made certain that the 1876 Constitution contained an article stating that the "Sultan as Caliph is protector of the Muslim

religion." With this policy of re-unifying the Empire by use of religion power, Abdülhamid II opposed the Western-educated modernizing elites.

The Young Turk movement began among those who were neither young nor ethnically Turkish. The name seems to have originated with La Jeune Turquie, published in France by a Lebanese⁵ Moronite Christian Khalil Ghanim. Among the Young Turks were there different organizations. One group of the exiles was led by Prince Sabahaddin; this group argued that Ottomanism in its most liberal meaning was the best unifying element. Another faction was known first as Vatan, then as Vatan ve Hurriyet, and finally as Osmanlı (Ottoman) Hurriyet. It consisted mainly of graduates of the War Academy in Istanbul, and included Mustafa Kemal. This group later merged with the Union and Progress, and was for a firm central government. All Young Turk groups were for radical changes and were formed and led by elites.

The Second Constitutional Period was initiated by the Young Turks in 23 July 1908. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) had an overwhelming majority in the parliament. Even though they were still ethnically and religiously diverse, with some⁶ developments that led to their consolidation of power, they cherished radical changes. In the process, the CUP then turned to Turkism, and secularism. The opposition in the parliament

was a liberal one, still claiming that Ottomanism was a *sine qua non* for reunification.

The Balkan Wars of 1912, and further secessions created serious doubts about the CUP, but the reconquest of Edirne by CUP ended in the expansionist hopes of its leadership. With the state limited to Anatolia and Arab lands except for eastern Thrace, the CUP, inaugurated new policies based on Turkish nationalism.

By that time, the intelligentsia, especially Ziya Gökalp, came up with new ideas. According to this theoretician of the Young Turks, the nation was the highest moral authority and the intelligentsia were the natural leaders of the nation. Gökalp and his friends recommended the CUP executives to provide education in Turkish, and in a secular form. The elites were trying to reshape society which they needed for the first time for the survival of the state.

During this intra-elite struggle, the masses were not included in any of the debates. The modernizing elite never had a pluralistic approach. To change and to reconstruct the society was their mission and this mission would be realized with or without the society.

2.3) The War of Independence and the Monoparty Period

The reexpansionist ideals of the CUP leadership led to the entrance of the Empire to the World War I. Pan-Turkist⁷ policies put an end to Ottomanism as well as to the Ottoman Empire. Even though some limited successes were attained in the World War I, the offensive aims catastrophically failed and some parts of Anatolia were invaded.

A resistance movement to invasion emerged in Anatolia. Societies of Defense of Rights were established by the local and national elites. Some members of the CUP and some other political military and intellectual elite left Istanbul for Anatolia to support the resistance movements. The Amasya Protocol of June 22, 1919, Erzurum and Sivas Congresses of July 23, 1919 and September 4, 1919, respectively, were the first signals of the new branch of elites aiming to save the Empire. A representative committee was elected for the execution of the nationalistic decisions of the congresses.

The resistance movements were not welcomed by the Istanbul government. Istanbul government was for a wait-and-see policy. According to the Istanbul government, the more the Ottomans will create obstacles for the invasion, the longer the invasion period will be. For this purpose they did not hesitate trying to eliminate the resistance movement. Thus, another intra-elite

struggle, that did not come to an end until the establishment of the new Republic, emerged.

An interesting characteristic of the War of Independence period was that even the bulk of the nationalist elites did not realize that the major aim of the leadership of resistance movement was a republic. To unite the forces, Mustafa Kemal and his close friends never openly pronounced any claims against the Sultanate, or the Caliphate.

The fight was against the "invaders." Some of the intelligentsia, by that time, were seeing a mandate of one of the Western powers as the only way out. It was inconceivable that all of the members of the first Turkish Grand National Assembly, convened in 23 April, 1920, would share the same worldview. Consisting of some ex-members of the last Ottoman Parliament, local religious leaders, military officers and intellectuals, this assembly was the only place where all the forces for independence had come together. Socialists, Islamists, Turkists, traditionals were among its members. There were heated discussions on policies to be followed; often consensus was very difficult to obtain.

At the beginning of the War of Independence, the masses did not feel loyalty to the National Assembly. Motivating the masses was a very difficult job for the nationalist elites. The Balkan

Wars, Libyan War and World War I had discouraged the masses from enthusiastically supporting one more war. Promoted by the Istanbul government and the invaders to some extent, six revolts took place during the war.⁸ These revolts were quelled quickly by force. This success of the National Assembly and the Greek invasion activated the masses.⁹ This was the first time that the elite and the mass have fought hand in hand for the same purpose.

After the end of the War of Independence, the National Assembly faced a difficult situation. Independence was attained and the coalition was over. On November 1, 1922 the sultanate was abolished. Not to provoke further resistance Mustafa Kemal and his friends did not at this time abolish the Caliphate. The winners of the war were popular all around of the country and the first group¹⁰ of the National Assembly won the majority of the seats in the general elections and was organized as a political party: The People's Party was established on September 9, 1923.

With the proclamation of the republic, October 29, 1923, the People's Party (now Republican People's Party, RPP) began its reforms. Abolishing of the Caliphate, the unification of education, enacting the new constitution (1924), the abolishing of tekkes (dervish lodges), the acceptance of the international calendar, the adoption of new civil law, the acceptance of new alphabet, granting of women's political rights, the law of

surname were the milestones of the modernization reforms of the Republican People's Party (RPP). Each being a revolution by itself, one can argue that almost everything was to be changed by the ruling elite. There were of course, opposition to these changes. The Progressive Republican Party (1924) and the Free Republican Party (1930) were two attempts of the opposing elites, both were eliminated, the former by a government decision, the latter by heavy persuasions. The masses resisted these changes by rebellion and revolts: Sheyh Sait Rebellion on February 13, 1925, Menemen Event on December 23, 1930, Dersim Revolt in 1935-38. All of these actions were quelled in a bloody manner by the ruling elite. For the first time, the masses had opposed a group of elites, by forceful means.

2.4) Multi-party Political Elite

After the World War II, the democracy which had won the war was a very appealing concept. Truman Doctrine, the threat from the Soviet Union, and a demanding new bourgeoisie were the causes of the Turkish transition to democracy. Even though it was a monoparty government, the RPP leadership opened the way to multiparty politics as it was the ultimate aim of its founders. Democracy was considered as an end by that time. The traditionals, having learned their lessons, did not oppose this new move. Their calling was a more pluralistic government. They found massive support in the society during their period of

opposition.

In 1950, the Democratic Party (DP) came to power. Supported by the newly rising bourgeoisie, large landowners and more importantly the masses which were demanding more goods and services from the government, they placed emphasis on national will. The leadership of the party was formed by the ex-members of the RPP. These leaders tried to pay-back the masses for the support that they had provided to the DP in the elections. The alliance of the local notables and the RPP was beaten by the DP and the masses. This was the first time that the masses became political actors.

Frederick W. Frey in one of his essays in 1979, wrote that:

Until quite recently, Turkish politics have been, for all major purposes, elite politics. As in most other developing societies, the political drama was limited to elite actors, elite institutions, and elite urban settings. Mass elements were excluded by the nature of the culture, the distribution of resources, and the design of the rulers. Thus until two decades ago an analysis of political elites in Turkey took a long way toward comprehending most of the meaningful political activities in the society. And even now, the main impact of the entry of mass elements into political life

has been the change produced in elite interactions... It therefore is still possible to analyze much of the thrust of Turkish politics by focusing on the political elite although this perspective will probably become¹¹ increasingly inadequate in the future.

In 1960, a military intervention took place. The bureaucratic elite, the RPP, and the university youth almost invited this intervention. The liberal economic policies of the DP had caused inflationary economics which decreased the buying power of the officials. The DP's suppressive policy towards any opposition caused bitterness among the intelligentsia. Also, their mild attitude towards Islam created extreme dissatisfaction among the same groups. Educated elites formed a large coalition to support the military intervention. Thus, following the intervention, two ministers, Polatkan and Zorlu, and the Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, who two days before the intervention had spoken to 200.000 of his supporters in İzmir meeting, were hanged by court order. The masses did not even protest, there was no overt opposition to the military intervention.

A new constitution was enacted in 1961. Political system was overhauled with addition of new institutions and organizations. Strong control mechanisms on politicians were established in the form, among other things of the Constitutional

Court and the National Security Council; top military officers were included in the latter. Some of the National Union Committee¹² members became "natural" senators of the newly established Senate, or the upper house. The 1961 Constitution also enlarged the scope of basic rights and liberties.

In 1965, the Justice Party (JP) came to power, receiving 52 percent of the votes. Established for "justice", this party claimed that they were the followers of DP. During JP administration relatively liberal economic policies were pursued. The massive support to JP showed itself in 1969 elections, as well; JP obtained 47 percent of the votes. Being of village origin, Süleyman Demirel¹³ had responded to the support given him by the masses by limiting the powers of bureaucracy. Politics were once again polarized. The university youth, like their generation elsewhere, became militant in their opposition. Anti-American groups had their representatives in the National Assembly, too; the Turkish Workers Party was the representative of the socialist elites. Thus, the RPP moved to the left of the center, but protected its bureaucratic elite characteristics. Organized political agitation, international events, and other factors combined to stimulate both the left and right wing violence. The JP governments response was, on the whole, consistently moderate - in fact, too much for the military who felt that things were again getting out of hand.

In March 1971, the military issued an ultimatum that effectively deposed the Demirel government, replacing it with a neutral above party administration led by technocrats. Martial law was proclaimed in many areas, houses searched, thousands imprisoned. Since the military declined to make, or realized they were incapable of, a full and lasting governmental take-over, they were dependent on cooperation from the parties, who cleverly used this dependence and increasingly alienated public opinion to pry the military away from its second intervention. After this intervention Bülent Ecevit¹⁴ and Süleyman Demirel acted together not to ratify military's favored candidate (the former Chief of General Staff - Gürler) for the presidency, even though Ecevit and Demirel were the leaders of the two competing parties in deep conflict.

Turkish politics in the 1970s was characterized by fragmentation and polarization, and by a lack of decisive authority on the part of the government.¹⁵ Polarization came to characterize not only the parties, but pervaded other important social sectors as well, including organized labor, the teaching profession, the civil bureaucracy, and even the police. The partisanship reached its peak, so did the political assassinations. Inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian cleavages caused massive outbreaks of communal conflict. The rampant inflation, accompanied by serious industrial slowdowns and shortages of consumer and import goods and an average of 20

political assassinations per day, added fuel to the fire.

The third military intervention took place on 12 September 1980. According to Frank Tachau and Metin Heper¹⁶, this intervention was multifaceted, including economic breakdown, civil violence, and open challenges to such highly symbolic values as secularist state. But in the eyes of the military elite, all these facets fused into one major failure of the system: the complete erosion of governmental authority. To re-establish this authority radical measures were taken: earlier on former political leaders were placed in a military camp; political parties were abolished; almost all the active politicians were banned from politics; a new constitution was enacted (1982) and Kenan Evren¹⁷ was elected president in the same referendum. Only three parties were allowed to compete in the elections of 1983. Labor, bureaucracy, university, and all the politicized sectors were "cleansed".

1980 military intervention thus aimed and succeeded the depolitization of the society. Military elite, confronting all other political actors, tried to pacify society. In this endeavour, they had popular support; 92 percent of the voters accepted the new constitution and the presidency of Kenan Evren.

Today, the government of Turkey is a coalition of two parties which were not allowed to participate at the 1983

elections, the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) and the True Path Party (TPP). Their overall support is very close to fifty percent. The SDPP claims itself to be the follower of the RPP, and the TPP to be the follower of the JP. According to these parties, the Motherland Party, in alliance with the military, created an erosion in all democratic and political institutions, and also suppressed the lower and middle-classes by its economic policies.

NOTES

1. Frederick W. Frey, "Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey", in Political Elites in the Middle East, George Lenczowski, ed. (Washington, D.C, American Enterprise Institute, 1979), p. 43.
2. Roderic H. Davison, Turkey (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, Spectrum Books 1968), pp. 8-9.
3. Frey, "Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey", p. 44.
4. Ibid., p. 45.
5. Lois A. Aroian and Richard P. Mitchell, The Modern Middle East and North Africa (New York, Macmillan, 1984), p. 113.
6. By that time revolts occurred in Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the announcement in Crete of union with Greece. These reverses experienced by the Ottoman State strengthened the hands of anti-Christian forces in parliament and eroded support for decentralizers.
7. Pan-Turkism aims at the unification of all Turkic peoples, namely the Turks of Central Asia, China, what is now the Southwestern part of ex-Soviet Union, Turkey, Iraq, Western Thrace, Iran, Cyprus.
8. Anzavur, Bolu-Düzce-Hendek, Konya, Milli Aşireti, Yozgat, and Tcherkess Ethem revolts, all in 1920.

9. In August 1921, Mustafa Kemal sent National Tax Orders to all the towns. National Tax Commissions, nationalized 40 percent of the clothes, oil, tires etc. that people owned. All the males under 40 were called to the military service. To achieve these ends Independence Courts were established and were furnished with great powers.
10. The supporters of Mustafa Kemal.
11. Frey, "Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey", p. 42.
12. The military committee formed after the intervention.
13. The leader of the Justice Party.
14. The new leader of the Republican People's Party.
15. Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey", Comparative Politics, 16 (1983): , p. 24.
16. Ibid., p.25.
17. General Kenan Evren, the leader of the military intervention. Evren was Chief of the General Staff at the time of intervention.

Chapter Three

TURKISH NATIONALISM: A BRIEF HISTORY

Who is ethnically a Turk? Historically, the Turks were nomadic peoples tightly organized into lineages, clans, and federations, and occupying the plains of Central Asia for at least three millenia. However, these Altaic-speaking peoples, probably due to overpopulation and the shrinking resources of the Asian steppes, surged westward and southwest into what is now eastern Europe and Turkey in several waves of migrations. Settled by their tribal or feudal leaders in conquered lands, especially in Anatolia and in eastern Europe in the period preceding the Ottoman Empire, they mixed with indigenous¹ population.

As the Balkan countries severed themselves from the Ottoman Empire and became sovereign states in their own rights, the majority of Muslims fled to Anatolia. They were resettled (especially after the Balkan wars and the World War I) in northwestern Turkey, often occupying land formerly inhabited by the displaced Anatolian Greeks. Also, Crimean Turks fled before the Russian conquest of their homeland, migrated to the Caucasus and Georgia, and from there to present-day Turkey,² hoping to preserve their Islamic faith and distinctive cultures.

3.1) The Roots of Turkish Nationalism

3.1.1) Ottoman Millet System

The millet system had its origin in the basic Islamic concept of dhimmi (or. zimmi) that is, the recognition accorded to, Jews and Christians as the "Peoples of the Book." The Muslim states had a strong religious mandate to protect non-Muslim citizens by subjecting the relations between them and the predominant Muslim society in which they lived to government control. Thus a strong, well-organized, and law-abiding Muslim³ government was the best guarantee for the rights of non-Muslims.

To the Ottomans, government was the art of ruling the unruly, reconciling the irreconcilable, and creating harmony out of ethnoreligious discord. The method selected to accomplish these ends was that of reinforcing the religious and social differences among its subjects, with clearly defined boundaries designed to minimize trespass and the resulting intergroup strife, while assuring each group its place in the administrative structure and guaranteeing its communal rights, so that these groups would not feel oppressed either by the⁴ central government or by other groups.

The ruling elites used the Turkish tradition of faith to the state to legitimize their authority in their effort to consolidate the community. The Ottomans stressed its religious rather than ethnic basis in the belief that religion generated stronger feelings of solidarity than blood and kinship. This approach was consistent with the pre-Ottoman pattern of organization in the territories they occupied, where the religious-ethnic community was in fact the basic unit of political organization but was not formally recognized as such within a constitutional framework.

The Ottoman's intentional promotion of the community, notably the religious community, as the unit of the administrative organization had not begun during the period of growth in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when the Ottoman state was predominantly an ethnic Turkish entity. The policy in question was generated in the fifteenth century, when the inclusion of large non-Turkic and non-Muslim groups turned the state into an empire in which groups of different religious persuasions were the main divisions.⁵ The millet system evolved over the second half of the fifteenth century, during which the Christian Orthodox millet (under the Greek Orthodox Patriarch), the Armenian millet (which included all the non-Orthodox Eastern Christians), and, finally, the Jewish millet were successively established.

The Ottoman State carried out the mandate to provide a place for non-Muslims with a high degree of sophistication. It concentrated its organizational efforts on the three broad categories of non-Muslim religious faith, but did not try to eliminate all the interfaith divisions stemming from the different ethnic characteristics of various groups so long as those ethnic characteristics were useful in consolidating the community and especially the state.⁶ In practice there was considerable diversity within the apparently homogeneous religious groups. The Orthodox and Armenian millets were officially led by their respective patriarchs and synods, but they had subdivisions- bishoprics and parishes- that followed ethnic and linguistic lines.⁷

Some argue that the tight adherence of non-Muslims to their ethnic-religious identities and communities strengthened their resistance to Ottoman rule and, incidentally, to conversion and assimilation into the Muslim Society. The opposite was true with regard to their relationship with the Ottoman government, for that government assured the survival of their communities as separate ethnoreligious entities; the rights of local self-government and cultural-religious autonomy were not special privileges granted to these particular groups, but were Ottoman constitutional principles.⁸ The government lost the allegiance of these smaller groups only when it failed to restrain the larger groups from actions that threatened their

ethnic integrity and autonomy.

The situation of the Muslim community was different from that of the non-Muslims. The Muslims were not officially recognized as a separate millet, although certain organizational features, such as the recognition accorded Şeyhulislam as the head of the Muslim community, were similar to those of the millets. However, the administrative power of the chief mufti were rendered relatively insignificant, his duties related to the administration of the Muslim community being assumed directly by the government.

While the Ottoman government took its legitimacy from Islam and enforced, to the extent possible, Islamic legislation, it did not identify itself politically and ideologically with the Muslim community until the late nineteenth century. As a ruling group the Ottoman elites had as little to do with ordinary Muslims as with the non-Muslims. The government power was the preserve of the Muslims, but it was available only to those Muslims - some of whom were converts - who first accepted everything the ruling order stood for. The Muslim's sense of religious identity deepened and came to supersede all other group and subgroup identities under the program to develop the ethnoreligious community as the basic unit of the constitutional system. The average Muslim knew that he lived under an Islamic government, but he knew too that he had no political power.

Only in the nineteenth century did he consciously begin to consider the government and the state as "his".⁹

The Muslim community encompassed a great number of ethnic and linguistic groups. Before it became a predominantly imperial entity, the early Ottoman state recognized these ethnic divisions. Islamic doctrine explicitly recognizes ethnic and tribal differences, but it forbids the use of tribal and national affiliation to achieve domination over other Muslims.¹⁰ Despite dedication to their new Muslim identity, the Bosnians and the Albanians nonetheless continued to preserve their separate ethnic-linguistic identity. Kurdish lords and Turkmen chiefs were given appointment letters as boz millet and kara millet respectively, though these letters were without political significance. Although in practice various groups, especially in the countryside, did maintain ethnic and/or linguistic distinctiveness, the emphasis on religion as the foundation of the community, and the co-opting into the ruling system of the Muslim tribal chiefs, heads of leading families, and communal leaders, reduced the bases of the appeal of ethnic and linguistic consciousness. And throughout the existence of the Ottoman state, in all of its censuses, the Muslims were listed as one group and were never categorized according to ethnic or linguistic differences.

3.1.2) Dismemberment of the Empire and its Conclusions

The nineteenth century brought change in the traditional ethnoreligious communities based Ottoman political system and also in the entire range of group-identity symbols and priorities. Critical here was the transformation of the ethnoreligious identities among non-Muslims into national identities with ethnicity as the basis of the new nationality.

The changes in the Ottoman social structure and the weakening of the central authority encouraged the rise of local ethnic and particularist tendencies in the form of a movement toward decentralization. The increased trade with Europe, and the economic, political, and military supremacy of the West, led to the rise of new merchant and intellectual classes among the non-Muslims. This change caused a drastic transformation in the structure, philosophy, and identity of the non-Muslim millets, especially the Christians, who broke up into smaller groups in which ethnic and linguistic affinity became outwardly the basis of identity. The Greek revolt of 1821, which undermined the authority of the patriarch as the leader of the Orthodox community, was the turning point for both the millets and the Ottoman government. After the uprising, the government's view of its non-Muslim subjects altered, and there was a change

of consciousness in the millets. For non-Muslim minorities foreign conferences organized by Western states became sounding boards for airing internal grievances that had once been channeled through representative institutions in the Empire. But this foreign intervention, probably intentionally, increased rather than resolved tensions.

The mass immigration from Ottoman territories under Christian threat began in the 1860s and reached its peak in 1878, and turned the Ottoman state into a predominantly Muslim entity. In addition, some structural, administrative, political changes that culminated in the establishment of new nations in the Balkans produced also the necessary class conditions for the transformation of the traditional Muslim community into a non-Muslim nation.¹¹ The disintegration of the traditional social and occupational structure, the demographic changes resulting from the massive immigrations, the settlement of the nomadic tribes, and an internal migration from rural to urban area, the introduction of a capitalistic economic system, the changes made in the administrative and political systems - all these combined to turn the Ottoman State into a different sociopolitical entity, a territorial state which was still Muslim in character.

Although it had all the characteristics of a modern nation, it was basically a politicized and enlarged community united by bonds of Islamic solidarity. The individual allegiance and loyalty of one part of the intelligentsia were transferred from the sultan to the impersonal national Muslim state.

3.1.3) Ottomanism

Ottoman decentralizers of all ethnic groups cooperated in search of a new national formula. This formula had to be a factor to let the survival of the Empire and to reunify all of the ethno-religious and ethno-linguistic groups.

Ottomanism emerged as the solution. According to Ottomanists, a decentralized federal state in which all minorities and ethnic groups will have a voice was the best solution for the reunification. Under a constitutional monarch, the sultan, an English type of state would satisfy aspirations of all minorities, especially of Armenians who still hoped to stay within the Empire.

But Ottoman leaders, reacted defensively. According to them, although the Ottomanists' claims were consistent with the traditions, the territorial Muslim state would be destroyed by this system.

3.1.4) Pan-Islamism

As already noted Abdülhamid II renewed government centralization after he consolidated his power and exiled the leaders of the Ottomanists. He expanded communication through telegraph lines and railroads. Bookprinting and newspaper publication spread, bringing both Muslim and non-Muslim subjects into contact with the printed word. During his reign, education and learning received government attention as primary¹² and secondary, teacher training courses were expanded as well.

Abdülhamid II became the official symbol of Pan-Islamism, a movement that aimed to reunify the Muslim world under a caliph: He used Pan-Islamism not only to help sustain his own power in what was left of the Empire, but also to extend it. Construction of the Hijaz Railway to facilitate the pilgrimage to Makka and Madina and the sending of emissaries to distant Muslim lands represented two aspects of this thrust. Even though¹³ the sultan was not of Quraysh descent, many Muslims accepted his claims.

The individual Muslim citizens gradually came to identify themselves with the new Ottoman Muslim nation, formed of different tribes and ethnic groups but having Islam as its binding ideology and Turkish as its official language. This was

a territorial state, the motherland, the vatan, to which ideally, all the Muslims would feel allegiance and loyalty. Implicit in the development of a supreme vatan was that its survival and welfare took precedence over the rule of the sultan, who could be challenged and deposed when his presence and policies became detrimental to the interests of the nation and vatan. Moreover, the idea that certain conditions within the motherland could be improved so as to strengthen the nation and make life better for the Muslims gained acceptance.¹⁴

Abdülhamid II played a vital role, using his policy of Islamism to shape the identity of the emerging Muslim nation. His task was basically a secular attempt, but he approached it in purely religious terms and relied on absolutist power to carry his policies to build a modern Muslim nation, with the Ottoman building blocks. Thus, he alienated the liberal intelligentsia and even some of his own religious followers.

3.1.5) Turkism, Pan-Turkism, Pan-Turanism

At this time internal opposition to Abdülhamid II, and the Ottomanists who were exiled, were in a process of organization. Concentrated mostly in the military schools, and in Europe, secret associations which demanded liberty were established one after another.

The Committee of Union and Progress was one of these organizations. Its name explaining its aims of "union" of the Empire and "progress" on the modernization direction, CUP gained strength in Macedonia and Salonica. It was for a firm central government in which all the ethnic groups would live in peace. With their organized power they made Abdülhamid II agree to recall the Ottoman Parliament on July 23, 1908.

The restoration of parliament had the effect of taking the wind out of the revolutionaries' sails. Their failure in solving the problems created obstacles for their planned reforms. After consolidating its power CUP, hand in hand with Armenian nationalist Dashnag Party and other minorities, introduced programs in the old Ottomanist spirit, even though the discord among ethnic groups was not ended. Education at the intermediate and higher levels was to be conducted in Turkish, secular education was expanded at all levels, with women in higher education though segregated. A secular nationalism was to be followed.

Alongside separatist nationalisms arose a Turkish nationalism. If subject peoples insisted on their own identity, so too would Turks.¹⁵ By that time the ideas of some nationalists, but especially those of Ziya Gökalp, were affecting the elites.

Turkism, like other currents of thought, came into being to find a new foundation for the Empire's political existence and cultural reconstruction. Turkists found this in Turkish culture. Until then, "Turk" denoted the Muslim peasants and nomads who spoke Turkish and "its application to the Ottoman gentlemen of Istanbul would have been an insult."¹⁶ But according to Turkists, without the cultivation of Turkish culture, there could be no genuine reform and modernization. The stimulation of Turkism and the transformation of the self-conception of the Turks was based on four factors:¹⁷ the disintegration of the Ottoman millet system, the decline of the idea of Islamism by the national movements of the Muslim groups, the development of nationalism among the Turkic speaking peoples in Russia, and the rise in Europe of political interest in Turkic speaking peoples and of Turcology in the nineteenth century.

The first two of these factors were discussed above. Turning to the third factor, several nationalists emigrated from Russia to the Ottoman Empire gave impetus to Turkism. Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Halim Sabit, Mirza Fethi, Ali Ahinzade, Zeki Velidi Togan with their actions and writings underlined the ethnic ties of Anatolian Turks with other Turks. Also, national and racial ideas were introduced to the Empire from Europe. Authors such as Josepf de Gruignes, Abel Remusat, Stanislas Julien, Henrich Julitas Klaproth, Edouard Chavannes, Wilhelm Thomson, Arminius Vambery, Leon Cahun, and Arthur Lambey Davids

were claimed to have had a formative influence on the Turkist leaders by cultivating a new consciousness of Turkish history and language.¹⁸

The CUP was influenced by the Turkish notion of national identity. With the additive effect of the Balkan Wars during which they realized that it was almost impossible to reunify all the ethnic minorities of the Empire, they shifted to an ethnic Turkish nationalism, mostly influenced by Ziya Gökalp.

The ideological basis of modern Turkish nationalism came from the works of Ziya Gökalp, a writer and sociologist who had been strongly influenced by Western thought. According to him, national sentiment was based on race, geography, political affinity, and chiefly culture – a culture made up of a common language, religion, system of ethics and art. Gökalp believed that Islam was an intrinsic ingredient of Turkish nationalism, but that it should be separated from the state and modernized so as to rid it of backward oriental characteristics. Its political ideas were influenced by collectivism: the individual self would find its social personality in collective enthusiasm.

An intellectual elite would lead society, helping the masses to express their dormant "true native" values through the development of a folk culture that united the nation in a linguistic group with a common education, religion, morality,

and esthetic ideal. Civilization, as distinct from culture, was material and practical. According to Gökalp, the Turks had a rich indigeneous culture, but were poor in civilization. While rejecting European culture, Turkey should, he believed, accept its civilization.

The national economic structure was in turn to mix the best aspects of socialism and capitalism. The capitalist system would be replaced by occupational unions and guilds bound together by national solidarity. To achieve economic progress, however, local industry would have to be supported against foreign competition; foreign advice and such controls as the capitulations and the Public Debt Commission would have to be abolished; and Islamic restrictions on and interference with capital investment would have come to an end.¹⁹

The CUP leadership adopted the recommendations of Gökalp. They tried to transform the Islamic nation, in which Turks and Arabs were the main actors, into an ethnic Turkish state on the basis of the European ethnic-national model. Their secularism which aimed essentially at eliminating the clerics' influence in the government, and their positivism were viewed by both Arab and non-Arab Muslims as directed at the essence of the newly emerging Muslim-Ottoman nation. The CUP realized that it had made a fatal mistake by adopting secular nationalism as state policy.

Then CUP leaders, especially Enver Pasha, made a suicidal mistake to overcome the fatal one. With the aim of gaining new territories and new allies to be unified with, he adopted Pan-Turkism which was an ideal of the unity of all the Turkic speaking peoples.²⁰ It was launched by the immigrants of Russia. By the World War I this irredentist Turkism "was adopted as a guiding principle of state policy by an influential group among the Young Turks who were determining the Empire's destiny."²¹ It was, however, this war that ended in disaster, which brought final discredit to irredentist ambitions.

3.2) The Development of Modern Turkish Nationalism

Following World War I the Ottoman Empire was not an empire anymore. It was disunited by and for the several ethnic groups that once created it. Also, most of its territories were invaded by the winners of the war.

The Defense of Rights movement and the War of Independence had begun against the imperialistic aims of the invaders. There was neither an ideological base nor a demand for the change in the political system. The goal to be attained was the ejection of the invaders; it was only a territoriality based struggle.

The first genuine nationalist sentiment among the masses developed during the Turko-Greek War between 1919-22. Greeks

identified their enemies as Turks, so did reciprocally the people in Anatolia. When the war ended with the glory of the resisters, there was a geographic area which was freed from the invaders, but not a state which was accepted by all its people.

3.2.1) Monoparty Nationalism

3.2.1.1.) National Compromise and its Territorial Conclusions

Turkey's importance is usually recognized in geopolitical terms. It is seen as the bridge between Europe and Asia - between West and East. It is valued for its control over the crucial waterways linking the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and Atlantic. Its agricultural potential and its resources of water and some other materials make the territory of Asia Minor an important one.

During the War of Independence, the Ottoman Parliament of Istanbul²² declared a national compromise. The national borders were described as the ones of present day Turkey with the addition of Mosul, where there are oil resources. In Western Thrace and Arab countries plebiscites were to be made. This compromise was adopted by the leaders of Anatolian forces. The Lausanne Treaty (July 24, 1923), approved these borders with the exception of Mosul; the latter was a matter of discord between Turkey and United Kingdom. The League of Nations facilitated the reaching of a reconciliation. In June 1926, Turkey

accepted English rights on Musul; Turkey was to receive some part of the oil revenues. In 1936, with Montreux Treaty Turkey obtained its control on the straits which were governed by an international commission until then. With the inclusion of Alexendretta to Turkey on June 23, 1939, the new state consolidated its authority on its present day territories.

3.2.1.2) Reforms of the New Government

After the abolishing of the Sultanate (November 1,1922), it was clear that a new political entity had been emerging. This view gained support when the second assembly was held in 11 August 1923 with a great majority of Anatolian and Rumelian Defense of Rights Groups. These groups organized themselves as the People's Party (later the Republican People's Party) and initiated a radical reform program.

Early changes implemented by the RPP government included separation of religion and the state, abolition of control by religious groups over wakf (religious foundations) bodies, the termination of the Sharia courts' authority, an end to religious schools, and introduction of coeducation. Wearing of clothing associated with religion was banned. The previously modern head-gear, the fez, was to be replaced after 1925 by hats. With the abolition of Sharia came also an end to the millet system. Armenians, Greeks, and Jews renounced their right to be judged

according to their own religious laws, and placed themselves under the rule of the new Turkish legislation.

To replace the old personal status laws, the Turkish government in 1926 resorted to adopting Swiss civil code. Under the new law, polygamy and the practice of repudiation allowed to men in marriage were to disappear. The law gave women equal rights in marriage and divorce. European penal and commercial codes were introduced.

In the other efforts to cut off the population from the Islamic Ottoman past, the Republicans substituted a European calendar for the Islamic one and abandoned the practice of beginning the new day with sunset. Because the RPP objected to the complete covering of women associated with Islam, it made several attempts to forbid them wearing the veil that covered not only the head but also the face. But no laws were passed requiring women to unveil. In 1924, nontaxpaying men could vote. Six years later women voted in local elections for the first time. In 1934, not only women were allowed to vote in national elections but they also had the opportunity to run for office. Nearly 5 percent of the Parliament in 1935 was composed of women.

The 1924 Constitution contained the clause "The Religion of the Turkish State is Islam" (Article 2) . In April, 1928 this

clause was dropped. However, full freedom to choose a religion did not come about until 1934.

These secular reforms were not sufficient for a concrete national identity. To promote Turkish identity, the RPP strove to eliminate Arabic influences by decreeing that the call to prayer should be made in Turkish. Persian and Arabic words were targeted for replacement, too. In 1928, the Turkish government replaced the old Arabic script with a new Latin script. The new Latin Turkish alphabet was simpler than the Arabic. The RPP regarded it as a vehicle for the expansion of literacy. It facilitated creation of a new past and a new future for Turkey. Young people in state schools would be cut off from all past writings except those the government chose to print in the new alphabet.

Ottoman history too, became the target of a Turkish revisionism often highly chauvinistic in outlook and content. History being the major tie with the Ottoman past, official research projects were launched to prove that originally Turks came from Central Asia, Turkish language and civilization were the source of all others and that the minority groups in the country were in fact of Turkish origin.²³ History, in other words, was rewritten to enhance Turkishness and to minimize Ottoman and Islamic identity.

3.2.1.3) Reactions to Reforms and the Response of the Republican People's Party

To digest these reforms was very difficult for the traditional elites and masses. Revolts and rebellions took place in the monoparty period, sometimes carrying ethnic characteristics.

On February 13, 1925, began the Sheykh Sait rebellion. Although the Kurds constituted an ethnolinguistic rather than religious entity, frustration of their nationalist inspirations and fixing of regional boundaries left them divided and unhappy. The monoparty regime, by trying to impose secularist-ethnic Turkish nationalism, added fuel to the fire. The 1925 revolt despite its religious overtones and leadership, represented a protest by the Kurds against the government's abolition in 1924 of all Kurdish societies, schools, publications, and institutions, including the religious ones. The Kurds had expected to be given special treatment for having aided suppression of the Armenians in the east in the 1910s. The revolt was quelled quickly. Over fifty Kurdish leaders were executed in Diyarbakır and another four hundred were killed in Elazığ. The Turkish government convinced the foreign press that the revolt represented religious reaction, not a move toward independence.

On December 23, 1930, a group of Naqshibendi sectarians and some local religious groups staged a revolt in Menemen, a town in the province of İzmir. They killed Lieutenant Kubilay who was trying to stop them, and, cut his head off. The government reacted quickly and all the participants were caught and hanged. This event was protested all around the country by the youth in meetings organized by the government.

Another Kurdish revolt in 1929, aided by Iran, provoked military intervention in eastern Turkey. The Kurds lost when Iran withdrew its aid, and Turkish forces surrounded the rebels from Iranian territory. The Turkish government approved the killing of thousands of Kurdish civilians. From 1935 to the end of 1938, residents of the remote area of Dersim fought the Turkish army rather than acquiesce to deportation which that ensued. The Kurds lost again when their ammunition ran out.

3.2.1.4) The Monoparty After Atatürk

During the 1930s there was a reawakening of a racist and irredentist Turkism which clashed with the official Turkish nationalism. The RPP elite aimed at promoting a Turkish identity and unity, for the purposes of nation-building; their nationalism was not chauvinistic. The emerging, Turanist-Turkist version of nationalism differed from the secular nationalism of the RPP. The proponents of the Turanist-Turkist

version of nationalism tried to develop a sense of extreme patriotism and pride in Turkishness.²⁴

Nazi racial theories and the rise of Nazism as a political movement were crucial influences. Several racist and irredentist journals (such as Atsız Mecmua, Orhun, Birlik, Ergenekon and Bozkurt) appeared in the 1930s. The World War II raised their aggressiveness. The President of Republic, İsmet İnönü, was for the preservation of Turkey's neutrality throughout the war. The Soviet Union pressured Turkey to suppress irredentist activities. Turkey officially declared that it had no territorial ambitions and, to placate Soviet suspicions,²⁵ increased its surveillance of Turkist Activities. This resulted in the repression of the Turkists in 1944. More than thirty leading Turkists, including Nihal Atsız, Necdet Sancar, Zeki Velidi Togan, and Alparslan Türkeş, were arrested. Several Turkist periodicals were closed down. These attempts to cut off all the ties between the state ideology of nationalism and Turkism/Pan-Turkism, resulted in the strong militant feelings among the latter's supporters, and in an anti-communist, anti-Soviet and anti-left Turkist discourse.

3.2.1.5) Nationalism Conception of Republican People's Party

Until the launching of multi-party politics and even after, the primary goal of monoparty nationalism was to construct a nation state, create a new national identity and foster national

unity and integration out of parochialism.²⁶ The reconstruction of the new state and society was to be achieved by the state led civilian-military bureaucracy merged within the RPP, and in accordance with the "Six Arrows" which became the state ideology in 1937; these were²⁷ republicanism, nationalism, revolutionism,²⁸ secularism,²⁹ etatism,³⁰ and populism.³¹

To be a bond for social cohesion hypernationalism was necessary. This hypernationalism, based on myths and other symbols, never became a chauvinism or a racism and even expansionism. Turkish ethnic culture - and some rediscovered past culture - was imposed to the citizens of the Turkish Republic. According to Atatürk, everyone who considered himself a Turk was a Turk. This broad definition of Turkishness eliminates all the doubts about a chauvinist nationalism. Also, according to all Turkish constitutions after the Republic, the citizenship rights of any citizen of the country, whatever his race, religion, creed were, had been taken under security.

For Atatürk, Pan-Turkism was an impossible ideal. He indicated that in the past all attempts to unify some nations under a central government always failed. He described his national policy as that of surviving and progressing in the national borders.³³ He argued that they did not follow Turanism ideals intentionally; for a country like Turkey it would have been a too ambitious undertaking.³⁴

But he did not follow this view himself. Even though League of Nations mandate for Syria prevented altering its boundaries, he wanted Alexandretta annexed to Turkey. He was less pleased when the results of elections in November 1937 assured minority status for Turks there. As the clouds of war gathered, France agreed to allow Turkish troops to occupy Alexandretta. The French presence gave Turks an advantage in securing a majority in the subsequent elections of 1938. Alexandretta was renamed as Hatay, and was set up as an independent entity. It immediately called for union with Turkey. In July 1939, France acceded to Turkey's annexation of Alexandretta in exchange for a nonaggression pact that would assure Turkey's neutrality during World War II. The Syrians, however, never accepted the detachment of Hatay from Syria.

Although Atatürk's nationalism conception and that of the RPP's were territoriality based, he used deeply ethnic policies for achieving national unity. The main aim of their nationalism was to reach the contemporary level of civilization.

3.2.2) Multi-Party Politics and Nationalism

After World War II, the monoparty government decided that it was time for democracy and launched multiparty politics. This decision was caused by some internal and external factors. Among the leaders of the party one group was in doubts

about the potential political organizations which will oppose the reforms; there were two experiences which were consistent with these doubts.³⁵ According to this group, secularism being the core of all the revolution, any threat toward this concept was to be eliminated.

The Democratic Party prepared itself for government during the period it was in opposition, 1946-1950. Its leaders being more moderate on religion and prone to a more liberal system, the party gained popular support and came to the government in 1950. One of its first performances was to convert the call to prayer from Turkish to Arabic, since the voters demanded this from the government. Another challenge to the reforms was on the etatism principle of RPP; liberal and somewhat inflationary economic policies were launched by the DP. For increasing their votes the DP followed populist policies. The official state conception of nationalism was kept, whereas religion was allowed to be one of the factors that shaped Turkish culture, but not national identity.

On the other hand, after World War II, with the changes in international politics, repression of the Turkists came to an end. In the aftermath of the war, while the Soviet Union made territorial demands and applied pressure for Turkey to revise the Montreux Treaty, the USA, in accordance with the Truman Doctrine, granted Turkey military and economic

assistance. It was now the turn of communist groups to be suppressed while several new Turkist organizations were permitted to appear.³⁶ With the advent of multi-party politics, and the liberalization of issues pertaining to religion, an interest in Islam began to surface in some, although not all, Turkist groups and periodicals because of the anti-religious policies of the ex-Soviet Union on the outer Turks. The stance of Islam formed the major dividing line among the Turkist groups.

Three major types of Turkish nationalism were present in Turkey before the 1960 military intervention, of which two were political party views. The RPP continued its secular nationalism. The DP's nationalism was based on all of the concepts that form RPP's nationalism, but included liberal economic policies and religion, the religion freed of its orthodox meaning. Militant Turkists, on the other hand, were for Pan-Turkism in its genuine sense.

The 1960 military intervention was made by a 38-member junta. Some members of the National Unity Committee into which the junta members organized themselves,³⁷ advocated the prolongation of the military rule and the implementation of cultural and technical reforms for establishing a truly radical nationalist state. However, "the fourteen" as they were called including some founding members of the Nationalist Action Party, were ousted five months later by the majority of the junta³⁸ members who expounded Kemalism of a moderate type.

The 1961 Constitution liberalized press censorship and adopted freer attitudes toward organized political activity. Thus, the new Constitution established a fertile ground for political organization. Like other groups, the Turkists took advantage of these new conditions and founded numerous organizations. In 1965, the conservative Republican Peasants' and Nation Party was taken over by a group which included several acknowledged Turkists including Alpaslan Türkeş and nine of "the fourteen". After a reorganization of the party, they changed its name to Nationalist Action Party (NAP) in 1969, and established a strictly hierarchical party structure in which loyalty was the most valuable asset. Thus, militant Turkist³⁹ nationalism found itself a home in a political party.

The DP was closed after the 1961 military intervention. The successor Justice Party (JP) maintained the DP version of nationalism.

The major change in the 1970s was the founding of the National Salvation Party (NSP) which was a pro-Islamic party. All the ideologies which were tried to unify the Empire, with the exception of Ottomanism, were adopted by political parties and thus came to have proponents in the Parliament: Pan-Islamism continued with the NSP, Pan-Turkism with the NAP, the CUP's, monparty's and Ziya Gökalp's secular nationalism with the RPP,

the DP's nationalism with the JP.

In 1975 and in 1977 Nationalist Front coalitions were established by the JP, NAP and NSP. These coalitions, and some other factors already mentioned,⁴⁰ exacerbated the differences between the Left and the Right wings, and terrorism took 20 victims per day in the summer of 1980. Marxist-Leninist, Maoist and other leftist groups gained ground and became effective among even the police. The "Idealist" movement, the militant action of the Turkists came as a reaction, aiming "to protect the state". Hearths of the ideal became the largest group of the Turkists, allegedly numbering 100.000 members in the late 1970s.⁴¹ Before 1980 military intervention, districts, streets, universities, some high schools and government agencies were partitioned into camps of the Right and the Left; even carrying a "wrong" newspaper in a district controlled by the opposite group could put one's life in jeopardy.⁴²

On 12 September 1980, the military once again came to power. General Kenan Evren, the leader of the military junta stated:

The aim of the operation is to safeguard the integrity of the country, to provide for national unity and fraternity, to prevent the existence and the possibility of civil war and internecine struggle, to re-establish

the existence and the authority of the state, and to eliminate the factors that hinder the smooth working of the democratic order.⁴³

Also, according to him "what lies at the basis of the Turkish Republic...is the sublime Atatürk's philosophy that says: 'Happy is he who calls himself a Turk'. This philosophy includes every citizen who considers himself a Turk regardless of creed, race or religion".⁴⁴ The military junta blamed all the political organizations and politicians for their incapacity of holding the state and the nation together. The military tried hard to promote Kemalism with its moderate nationalism.

Even though the military government was definitely Kemalist, it did not try to eliminate the idea of the Turkish-Islam synthesis⁴⁵, which had been developed for some time for the purpose of using it as a unifying factor in the fragmented society. This synthesis, basically formulated by the Aydınlar Ocağı (The Hearth of Enlighteneds), was for a nationalism which was equally influenced by ethnicity and religion. Being strongly reactive to leftist ideas and organizations, they argued that the Ottoman state, history and culture were the roots of the present-day Turkish polity and society.

By 1982, new parties emerged, after they were allowed to by the military government. But the parties which declared, or even gave the impression, that they were the continuum of the pre-1980 parties, were not allowed to enter the elections. The Motherland Party (MP) came to the scene as a united (right) party. Claiming that it was a synthesis of all the major parties of the pre-1980 period, it had the support of the Turkish-Islamists. Many members of the now defunct NAP, NSP and JP voted for the MP, and many of the ex-members of these parties became its members.

The referendum of 1987, however, gave back the right of active politics to the banned politicians. The successor parties to the pre-1980 parties were now opened. In the right wing of the political spectrum were there now the Prosperity Party (successor of the NSP), Nationalist Work Party (successor of the NAP) and True Path Party (successor of the JP) and the MP which claimed that it was the synthesis of all the pre-1980 political parties .

The discourses of the successor parties were not different from their predecessors, but the depolitization policy of the military government, and the comfort of living in security, discouraged many from taking a partisan stance on conflictual issues. Being "democrat" and moderate person was increasingly

emphasized.

3.3) Ethnic Groups and their Demands

In the Republic of Turkey there are two major ethnic groups: Turks and Kurds. Kurds are around 10-20 percent of the population. It is claimed that in 60 years Kurds will be in the majority.⁴⁶ Speaking different dialects and holding different religious sects, the Kurds do not present a homogenous entity, however, to a large extent, they share the same folkloric rituals.

⁴⁷
According to Milton Esman and Itamar Rabinovich the Turkish state structure explicitly incorporates the aspirations of the dominant ethnic group. Others are expected to accept a different relationship to the state than members of the dominant group. The former might enjoy explicit and recognized rights, they might be encouraged to assimilate as individuals, or they might be culturally repressed, economically subordinated, and in some cases encouraged to emigrate. Combinations are possible, the main point being that the state is regarded as the instrument of a single ethnic group; other groups must accommodate themselves to the terms of coexistence determined by the dominant group.

The last constitution of Turkey was approved by 92 percent of the population in a referendum in 1982. Article 26 of the Constitution states that no language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought. Any written or printed documents, photograph records, magnetic or videotapes, and other media instruments used in contravention of this provision will be confiscated. Article 28 declares that publications will not be made in any language prohibited by law. These two articles were changed by the Motherland Party and the opposition. Since then newspapers and magazines have been published in Kurdish, as well as tape cassettes folk songs in Kurdish.

Article 57 of the Constitution stipulates that all political activity must promote "the indivisibility of the national homeland" and Article 89 provides, in part, that "no political party may concern itself with the defense, development, or diffusion of any non-Turkish language or culture; nor may they seek to create minorities within our frontiers or to destroy our national unity."

The question of why Turkish state and its leaders needed to put this kind of clauses in the constitution could only be answered by the "divisiveness anxiety". According to Şerif Mardin, there is the tendency of each group to accuse others of "evil designs" and "trying to divide the Turkish nation".⁴⁸ Frederick W. Frey adds that the Turks may have good reason to fear divisiveness, not only objective reasons in the form of

external threats or an extremely heterogeneous society, but valid reasons deriving from an awareness of their own psychological tendencies toward extremism in commitment and contention. But in this approach, the historical experiment of the Turks was overlooked. A century ago, Turkish state was an empire with huge resources and territories. Step by step, it was dismembered and every particular loss of territory created deep disappointments and anxiety in Turkish society. These feelings and the fear of getting smaller rendered the founders of the Republic and their followers cautious and sensitive to the issues of national unity.

Today, Kurdish leaders seem forced to seek increasingly radical political solutions if they hope to sustain their culture and their distinctive identity. Some form of official enfranchisement, and some degree of pluralism, is, therefore, crucial both to the exercise of their authority from within traditional ethnic boundaries and from without, in Turkish society. At least one outcome of this unrelenting social reality is the intensifying feeling of political alienation in these communities. Under such circumstance, social life and ethnic boundary maintenance may, indeed, take on an extremist dimension.

The Secretary General of PSKT (Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan), Kemal Burkay demands from the coalition government of the SDPP and TPP the lifting of the martial law, the right of

political activity for all, an unlimited freedom of thought and organization, the education and broadcasting in Kurdish and the usage of Kurdish in governmental affairs.⁴⁹ According to him all the separatist forces are turned to be for a federal or structurally plural state. If the state would end its suppressive policy, all political activity directed against peace and democracy will lose its significance.

It is clear that Turkish government will continue to resist strongly to any attempt by the Turkish Kurds to achieve political autonomy. It not only has a large army and other security forces in the east, but also is capable of quickly reinforcing them. In addition, most Kurds oppose the separatists' actions. An official in Hakkari commented, "The people know that their future prospects are much more likely to be improved by attracting industry and expanding agriculture than by helping a bunch of insurgents create anarchy".⁵⁰

3.4) Dialectical Summary of Turkish Nationalism

Nationalism in Turkey followed a path which was full of curves. Every type of nationalism emerged when the precedent could not succeed in forging unity among the citizens. Ottoman millet system could not survive because of the ethno-religious aspirations in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Pan-Islamism alienated the non-Muslims, and Muslims with its way of

application. Ottomanism, being secular, overlooked the fact that historically peoples of the Empire had never known any other allegiance than the religious one. Pan-Turkism with its irredentism, accelerated the demise of the Empire. Kemalist nationalism tended to ignore religion. Center-right nationalism is still in practice nearly for forty years, but it is challenged by Islamism, Pan-Turkism and secular nationalism.

Witnessing this phenomena, that is the dismemberment of the Empire and simultaneously the changes in nationalism, one is forced to raise the question of whether different nationalisms helped to dismember the Empire or the dismemberment created new versions of nationalism. It is beyond the scope of this study even to begin to answer the query.

Very interestingly, however, always one conception of nationalism was represented in governmental circles, and with the introduction of multi-party politics, almost all of the past nationalisms found a niche in political parties. An anti-thesis to nationalism never found the opportunity to oppose it in equal power.

The question of Turkish national identity is a dialectical one. Although they make up only a small percentage of Turkey's population, nondominant ethno-religious groups continue to play

an apparently important role in defining Turkey's self-identity and its self-conscious stance.

NOTES

1. V.J. Parry and H. İnalcık, A History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp.1-3.
2. S.D. Salamone, "The Dialectics of Turkish National Identity: Ethnic Boundary Maintenance and State Ideology", East European Quarterly, 1(1989): p.50.
3. Kemal H. Karpat, "The Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the Middle East" in Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East, Milton J. Esman and Itamar Robinovich eds. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 40.
4. Ibid., p. 43.
5. Ibid., pp. 39-40
6. Ibid., p. 40.
7. For example, during the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent (1521-1569) the Serbians, officially part of the Orthodox millet, were permitted to reopen their own church, apparently through the intercession of the Grand Vizir. The Serbian church was closed in the eighteenth century under the pressure of the Greek patriarchate's neo-Byzantine nationalism; however, in the countryside the Orthodox church continued to function, divided as always into parishes in which language was Bulgarian, Serbian, Vlah, and so on, according to the prevailing ethnolinguistic characteristics

- of the inhabitants of the various areas.
8. See Karpas, "The Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the Middle East", p. 42.
 9. Ibid., p. 45.
 10. The Koran, Sura 49, verse 13.
 11. See Karpas "The Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the Middle East", p. 49.
 12. Lois A. Aroian and Richard P. Mitchell, The Modern Middle East and North Africa (New York, USA., Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984) p. 112.
 13. The tribe of the Prophet Mohammad.
 14. See Karpas "The Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the Middle East", p. 50.
 15. One of the minority Parliament member even said: 'My Ottoman citizenship is as much as that of Ottoman Bank'. Ottoman Bank belonged to French businessmen.
 16. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p.2.
 17. Ayşe Neviye Çağlar, "The Greywolves as Metaphor" in Turkish State, Turkish Society, Andrew Finkel and Nükhet Sirman eds. (London: Billing and Sons Ltd., 1990), p.82.
 18. Ibid., p. 83.
 19. Düyun-u Umumiye, in Turkish, it was established by the foreign creditors of the Ottoman Empire to control its revenues and to take away these revenues in return for the debts of the Empire. For detailed views of Ziya

Gökalp see Jacob M. Landau, Panturkism: A Study of Turkish Irredentism(Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, 1981)

20. Turkism, Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanism are not the same phenomenon although they were used as one and the same thing. Turkism is for Anatolia, Pan-Turkism is for Anatolia and Russia, Pan-Turanism is for Anatolia, Russia, Hungaria, Finland, Mongolia and their hinterland.
21. Jacob M. Landau, Panturkism: A Study of Turkish Irredentism (Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, 1981), p.44.
22. Explained in chapter 2.
23. Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, 'The Ideology and Politics of the Nationalist Action Party of Turkey', C.E.M.O.T.E., 13 (1992), p. 143.
24. Ibid., p. 143.
25. Landau "Panturkism: A Study of Turkish Irredentism", p. 112.
26. Sakallıoğlu, "The Ideology and Politics of the Nationalist Action Party of Turkey", p. 142.
27. Republicanism confirmed the idea of the old Ottoman Empire, with its framework of the rulers and the ruled, had now given way to a republic in which each citizen had a state and from which each received security and well-being.
28. Revolutionism symbolized the regime's commitment to rapid rather than evolutionary change, with the rejection of tradition when it proved detrimental to the national

- interest.
29. Secularism meant separating religion from the politics, establishing new educational and legal systems, and eroding the authority of both religion and religious functionaries.
 30. Etatism worked toward economic self-sufficiency through mixed economy dominated by state-controlled or state-operated industry.
 31. Populism was to reinforce republicanism by emphasizing political and legal equality as well as participation in governing the country through representative government, and to deny class differences in the society.
 32. See Sakallıoğlu, "The Ideology and Politics of the Nationalist Action Party of Turkey", p. 143.
 33. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk II (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1966), pp. 436-7.
 34. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, quoted in Ergun Özbudun, "Siyasi Lider olarak Atatürk", Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, Ankara, 2 (1986) , p. 653.
 35. Explained in chapter 2.
 36. Hearth of Turkish Culture, Turkish Youth Organizations, Turkish Cultural Association, Federation of Union of Nationalists are some examples.
 37. Explained in chapter 2.

38. See Sakallıoğlu " The Ideology and Politics of the Nationalist Action Party of Turkey", p. 144.
39. For a good analysis of the NAP's and its leader's (Alparslan Türkeş) ideology, see Jacob M. Landau, Middle Eastern Themes (London: Frank Cass , 1973), pp. 277-89.
40. Explained in chapter 2.
41. See Landau "Panturkism: A Study of Turkish Irredentism", p. 148.
42. See Çağlar, "The Greywolves as a Metaphor", p. 79.
43. Quoted in Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, 'The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey', Comparative Politics, 1(1983) , p. 26.
44. Ibid., p. 27.
45. For a good account, see Bozkurt Güvenç, Gencay Şaylan, İlhan Tekeli, Şerafettin Turan, Türk-İslam Sentezi (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1991).
46. Aktüel(Istanbul weekly), 28, 16-22 January 1992, pp. 20-4.
47. Milton Esman and Itamar Rabinovich eds., Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988) p. 16.
48. Şerif Mardin, quoted in Frederick W. Frey, "Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey", in Political Elites in the Middle East, George Lenczowski ed. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), p. 67.
49. Aktüel, 2-8 January 1992, p. 117.

50. Michael M. Gunter, "The Kurdish Problem in Turkey",
The Middle East Journal, 3 (1988) , p. 404.

Chapter Four

TRUE PATH PARTY AND NATIONALISM

4.1) Development of the True Path Party

Following the 1980 military intervention Süleyman Demirel was sent to Hamzaköy, a military camp. Even before his return to Ankara, he tried to keep in touch with all levels of the party organization, for avoiding the threat of disunity which had occurred in 1971. During this early period he did not utter any word against the military and its government, and he even sent the summaries of the interviews made with foreign press,¹ to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs claiming that the state belongs to all.

On October 16, 1981, military government closed all the political parties including, of course, the JP. This made bitter the relationship between Demirel and the military government, but the real polarization occurred when the draft constitution that was to be presented to the people in November 7, 1982 took its final shape. All pre-1980 active politicians were banned from politics. Although center-right was² experienced in finding loopholes for restrictions of this kind, staying away 10 years from active politics was unacceptable for the JP leadership. The 92 percent approval of the Constitution

was another disappointment. Whatever the conditions were, Demirel continued to keep in touch with all levels of the JP organization.

In fact the JP waited only for a signal from its leader: Soon Great Turkey Party, with its name being a slogan of JP, was founded . Led by a retired General, Fethi Esener, this party was a definite successor to the JP. As a result, it was closed down by the military government, despite General Esener, and the top leaders of the JP and RPP were sent to Zincirbozan, a military camp again. On the road, Demirel decided to establish the TPP.³

Although it satisfied all the legal provisions, the TPP was not allowed to compete in the elections of 1983. Its voters mostly voted for the Motherland Party (MP), which was headed by Turgut Özal, one of the Demirel's favorite bureaucrats. Özal claimed that his party represented a synthesis of the four major pre-1980 parties. The MP won the 1983 elections .

In the absence of Demirel, the TPP was headed by Hüsamettin Cindoruk and became a strong out of parliament opposition. The self-abolishment of the Nationalist Democracy Party in 1984, which was the favorite of the junta, created the opportunity for the TPP to organize a parliament group. With the pressure of this and the SDPP parliamentary group a referendum was held in

1987 on the question of the political restrictions on former politicians. With a very small margin, the voters gave the political rights back, and the MP called early elections before the results of the referendum were obtained.

The 1987 elections increased the MP majority in the parliament; and the TPP won 59 seats. Although the main opposition party was the SDPP, because of the competition on the center-right votes, the TPP resorted to aggressive opposition.

The early elections of 21 October 1991, made a coalition obligatory, since no party could obtain the majority. A coalition could not be formed without the TPP. Even though the center-rightists seemed to wish a TPP-MP coalition, the TPP had decided to make a coalition with SDPP.

4.2) The Nationalism of Nationalism of the True Path Party

4.2.1) Conjunctural Changes: Potential Factors on True Path Party's Nationalism

The second decade of the twentieth century was a turning point in human history. Ideologies, borders, cultures and societies found themselves in an irresistible process of change. The same was true for the second decade preceding the century's end, 1980-90. The destruction of the Iron Wall had a deep impact on ideologies, borders, cultures and societies. The

change was not only the disarrangement of the bipolar equilibrium of the super powers of USSR and USA, but the whole world system. The self-abolishment of Warsaw Pact let loose all members of the communist block; "Frank Sinatra doctrine"⁴ permitted every one to do it its way. Quickly ethnic problems came to the agenda. The reunification of the two Germanies and the disunification of the Soviet Union increased ethnic conflicts. Yugoslavian and Czechoslovakian experiments were of the same origin. Ethnicity came to the agenda of the world which was now led by democratic capitalist powers. Being democratic, these powers encouraged the minority and ethnic rights. The New World Order is for the liberal democratic state; any anti-democratic suppression, any illegal use of force would be tried being stopped by the international community.

Another important result of the destruction of the Iron Wall was the emergence of the new Turkic republics in the former Soviet Union. Sharing an ethnic culture with Turks, Kazaks, Üzbeks, Azeris, Turkmans, Tatars, Abhazas and to some extent Tajiks are now living as independent entities. Their need for modernization created an interest in these countries towards Turkey which, even though not yet fully succeeded, had made considerable progress on the road to modernization. These states see Turkey as a secular-democrat-liberal-model from which they can take lessons, but their main interest is in Turkey's liberal economy.

Although it all began with 24 January 1980 decisions of Demirel government, liberal economic policies reached their peak during the early part of the period of MP governments. Turkish economic system turned from import substitution to export-promotion policies. With export promoting strategies, in ten years (1980-1990) exports increased by 1000 percent, car⁵ production by 600 percent, and tourism revenues by 900 percent. In all sectors production increased 2-3 times, with the exception of agriculture. Parallel with the economic growth, Turks increasingly became "homo economicus". The materialist values, perhaps for the first time in Turkish history, found support in society.

This economic growth and the depolitization policies of the junta as well as the bitter memories of the pre-1980s created a new political culture. Aggression and aggressive political activities lost their value; stubbornness and uncompromising attitudes left their place to dialogue and reconciliation.

All these changes affected Turkish nationalism. The Democratic Left Party (DLP), founded by the ex-leader of the RPP, Bülent Ecevit, was blamed for being fascistic when it claimed that the Turkic republics are in the interest area of Turkey. The Nationalist Work Party (NWP) founded by Alparslan Türkeş as a successor to the NAP, never even mentioned the

unification of Turkey and Turkic republics. Although his party was for a Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the MP leader Turgut Özal argued that a federative solution to the South East Anatolia problem should be discussed. All the concepts and principles which shaped the political parties' definitions of nationalism in pre-1980 period now had their anti-theses. The one and the only "consistent" party is the Prosperity Party (PP) which sees Islam as the basis of national identity, not unlike its predecessor the NSP.

Also among the intelligentsia are there brand new themes, and the taboos of the pre-1980 period are shattered. "New-Ottomans" are for an active foreign policy toward the political entities in the former Ottoman territories. They visualize an empire - in this age perhaps a federation - of which the capital is Istanbul. "Second Republicanists" are for a more democratic-liberal state, claiming that the Turkish state should be minimalized; and emphasis should be placed on the individual. They see the RPP, which will be re-opened as the pioneer of this change.

4.2.2) The True Path Party and Ethnic Nationalism

The oath-taking ceremony of the new members of the Parliament took place on November 7, 1991. When Hatip Dicle came to take his oath, he said that he and his friends were

doing this under the pressure of the Constitution. Then Leyla Zana carried a handkerchief in the colors of the flag of the Kurdish separatists, and after her oath she spoke in Kurdish. Both of the parliament members were of Kurdish origin, and ex-members of the People's Work Party which entered the elections on SDPP's lists. The event created a strong reaction among MP, Nationalist Work Party and TPP parliament members. The TPP members found in themselves the courage of trying physically to stop their Kurdish fellows. The Assistant Speaker of the Parliament and a TPP member of Kurdish origin, Ali Rıza Septioğlu who was presiding the session, invited the activists to act within the Constitution and retake their oaths "properly". MP and TPP members were not satisfied and insisted that these two members should apologize. Demirel, commenting on the incident, said that it was an expected publicity campaign as well as a provocation and indicated that the reaction of the Parliament was not racial or ethnic, but constitutional.⁶

According to the Speaker of the House who was elected on the TPP ticket, Hüsametdin Cindoruk, TPP's nationalism cannot be questioned, but it is not a racial but cultural nationalism;⁷ it may also be called republican nationalism. Demirel, parallel to Cindoruk, said that people in Turkey have different ethnic origins; almost an Ottoman mosaic exists in Turkey; the Republic became a cement in uniting these people.⁸ Ayvaz Gökdemir, in his serial in Tercüman, claimed that in Turkey

there were ethnic groups but a Turkish nation, and every single individual who was a Turkish citizen has been accepted as a Turk,⁹ and Atatürk's nationalism was a cultural one aiming at raising the national culture to a higher level than contemporary civilization.¹⁰

On the other hand, one of the candidates for the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the TPP, Coşkun Kırca¹¹, pointed out that the history shows that it is not necessary for every ethnic group to become a nation and a state, and that different ethnic groups could live within a state, a super-culture. According to him, the Kurdish culture is a sub-culture which did not produce¹² any significant cultural product in arts like architecture. He asserted that although the Ottoman Empire was not a national state, in that Empire the dominant group was made up of Turks or Turkified individuals. In a parallel manner, Ayvaz Gökdemir argued that Turks set up Turkish Republic and became its protectors.¹³ Süleyman Demirel, too, said that the Turkish state was established by the people of Turkish descent but the others are not second class citizens.¹⁴

In the TPP, there are, therefore, some members who support ethnic Turkish nationalism. They deny the significance of any other ethnic group rather than the Turks inside of Turkish borders. They are known as the hawks of the TPP. Inheriting the JP's conception of nationalism, they are unwillingly granting legitimacy to any ethnic group which might destabilize Turkey.

They adopt the nationalist politics of the monoparty period that were inflexible and which were based on the presumed dominance of the Turkish element, but their ethnic nationalism is instrumentalist rather than primordialist, these two types of ethnic nationalism were discussed in Chapter One.

Another group inside the TPP is not for an ethnic Turkish nationalism:

....Turkish nationalism is a moderate nationalism which is not based on race and which does not reject other ethnic groups in Turkey. The nationalism in question is not chauvinistic, not racist; it only serves Turkey's
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unity.

This group realize the significance of the South Eastern Problem while the world is furthering democracy. They, therefore, do not subscribe to ethnic nationalism. According to them recognizing the Kurdish reality would not fragment Turkey since the Turks and Kurds share the same history. Together, they experienced both pride and shame. They built
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this country together by giving their blood. Demirel pointed out that, now, it was impossible to oppose the individual who speaks Kurdish and belittle his Kurdish origin; because of this
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the government recognized the Kurdish reality. Bedrettin

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Dalan in line with Demirel, blamed the MP party to foment chauvinism in Turkey. He especially opposed Turgut Özal, who once said that he had Kurdish origins too, claiming that MP and its economic and security policies brought about the South Eastern Problem.¹⁹

Even though, there are differences among the party members concerning nationalism, they are for the same foreign policy toward the outer Turks. In a television forum made on December 30, 1991, Demirel referred to the emergence of the new Turkic republics as a very important development. He said that a new Turkish world has been created from the Adriatic to the Chinese Sea, and this new world offered both opportunities and responsibilities for Turkey.

According to the TPP, close relations with the newly emerged Turkic communities, and Turkey's guidance to these communities on the road to modernization are the accurate policies. A cultural unification with these communities will help Turkey at the international arena, too. But a federation or any other geographical or political unification is out of question.

4.2.3) The True Path Party and Territorial Nationalism

One phrase of the 1982 constitution summarizes the territorial dimension of TPP's nationalism, "the indivisible unity of the state with its country and its nation." The TPP earnestly emphasizes this indivisibility.

The TPP's by-laws define the unity of the country and its security as the basic principles of its nationalism.²⁰ Among the aims of the Party are the preservation of the national and geographical unity of the state, and the protection of the Republic against all kinds of destructive, separatist and divisionist acts and movements.²¹ To be a member of the Party one should believe by heart in the singularity and the unity of the Republic.²²

The party leadership's view is consistent with the above statements. In their election manifesto of 1991, it is stated that, the TPP does not recognize any value more dominant or more precious than the national and territorial unity of Turkey.²³ It is also stated that the indivisible unity of the country is the sine qua non basis of Turkish national and international politics.²⁴ According to İsmet Sezgin (Minister of Internal Affairs), it is a citizenship duty and responsibility to oppose any attempt against national unity for which much blood was sacrificed.²⁵

The near xenophobic feelings of the TPP's leadership toward any threat to territorial unity is observable in their speeches, too. Sezgin said that throughout the history, because of its geopolitical importance, countries which had interests on the region, and the neighbours who had felt anxiety of a developed Turkey, made attempts to weaken Turkey, and they continue to do so.²⁶ Cindoruk, going one step further, described those countries which support the separatist terror as aggressors.²⁷ Demirel blamed some western countries to be the supporters of the ethnic separatist terror and to threaten the world peace.²⁸

Pointing to the indestructibility of the Misak-ı Milli borders being the core of the territorial dimension of the TPP nationalism, Gökdemir argued that blood, faith and culture turns a land into a country. He added that after 1080, the territories of present-day Turkey are recorded in history as "Turcia."²⁹ Turkish nation converted this geography into a Turkish and Muslim land, by their works of arts and the roads they built.³⁰ Cindoruk argued that the shared aim of the citizens of Turkish Republic, should be that of defending the country. He mentioned that he would not even listen to discussions on the division of the Republic of Turkey.³¹

One can conclude that, the territorial dimension of TPP's nationalism is its core. The indivisibility of vatan is more important than the national unity based on cultural background. Cultural nationalism, but not ethnic nationalism, is only a means to maintain the indivisibility of the territory.

This territorial rather than ethnic character of the TPP's nationalism changes totally when the subject matter is the outer Turks. The hawks are for a more active foreign policy concerning the Turkic republics³² and that the leader of the TPP talks about a new Turkish world from Adriatic to the Chinese Sea. Here, however, cultural nationalism, but still not ethnic nationalism, shapes party's dominant approach. Geographical unity of Turkic states in the form of a federation is never mentioned by the TPP leadership.

4.2.4) The True Path Party and the South Eastern Problem

During the period it was in opposition, the TPP blamed the MP government of bringing the country to a point of disunity. According to the TPP the socioeconomic policies of the MP and its handling of the South Eastern Problem by using force, decreased the loyalty of the people living in the region to the state. They shifted their sympathy, if not their support, from the state to the separatist forces.

In their manifesto for the 1991 elections, TPP leaders stated that the MP government, with heedlessness, put the country in a search for national identity, and caused political and social fluctuations in the country.³³ Also, Dalan who once was a MP mayor, blamed the MP government for bringing the country to the edge of a civil war with wrong economic policies, and for oppressing the South Eastern people. He added³⁴ that the state and nation came to oppose each other.

According to Sezgin, the citizens living in the region were looking for their state. They were expecting to have a decent living standard, love and respect, and humanistic approaches³⁵ to their problems. He also argued that these citizens were for³⁶ social peace and social consensus.

The solution package of the government led by the TPP for the problem emphasized regional economic development and pluralist democracy. Regional economic development policies, including social ones, will lead to a rise in the living standards of the people. Pluralist democracy will eliminate the second class citizenship feelings on the part of these people. There is a necessity to distinguish the people from the separatist forces; to the latter government could not act even in a moderate manner.

Regional development policies of the TPP were described in detail in the election manifesto of the party.³⁷ It is stated that for the TPP the development of the South Eastern Anatolia is not only an economic problem, but a basic mission that should succeed for the sake of the integrity of the country. It is necessary to put an end to poverty in the region; this can be done only by productive direct investment by the state.

The pluralist democracy, on the other hand, is a more difficult goal to attain, compared to economic development, because the TPP fiercely opposes all kinds of political activity against the integrity of the country, even if this activity is not violent.³⁸ Also the party is against federative solutions.³⁹

Although the TPP strongly opposes federalism or confederalism, it recognizes the necessity for more democratization. The 1982 Constitution which, banned almost all of the top leaders of the TPP from active politics and tried to create a "depoliticized" political system, gave birth to the famous slogan of the TPP, "speaking Turkey". The open regime in which everyone could speak is one of the goals of the TPP. Pluralist democracy policies emerge on these points. Sezgin described their aim for coming to the government as that of creating a fair,⁴⁰ honest, contemporary, transparent and democratic state.

The major change in the TPP's approach to the South East Problem when it came to government was the recognition of "the Kurdish reality". In Demirel's words:

There is no such thing as we and you, there is just us. The Kurdish identity refers to the people who speak Kurdish, who say "I am of Kurdish origin." Recognizing the Kurdish reality will not jeopardize the protection of
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Turkey's unity.

For the TPP the main problem in the region is the second class citizen feeling on the part of the people. Such a feeling alienates the people from the state. Demirel often says that everyone is a first class citizen of Turkey.

The TPP's attitude toward the separatist terror organizations is clear: the gun-firing man should be stopped at
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all costs according to Demirel. But while doing this, the TPP government differentiates the innocent people from the terrorists. The struggle against the terrorists will stay within the limits of law. And the innocent people of the region will be "sure that it is the milkman [and not a terrorist] who is knocking on his door in the early morning."

NOTES

1. Yalçın Doğan, Dar Sokakta Siyaset (1980-1983) (Istanbul, Tekin Yayınevi, 1985) pp. 124-8.
2. When the Democratic Party leaders and parlementerians were arrested after the 1960 military intervention, Ragıp Gümüşpala, a retired general became the leader of the JP, functioning as a shield against the military.
3. See Doğan, "Dar Sokakta Siyaset", pp. 343-5.
4. The spokesman of the Soviet politbureau described this doctrine as follows: "I did it my way."
5. Ahmet Özden and Hakan Tunç, "Türkiye Ortadoğu'nun Japonyası", Aktüel, (January 2-8 1992), p. 24.
6. The TPP parliament members Ertekin Durutürk and Ethem Kelekçi reached the oath-taking pulpit, took the handkerchief of Hatip Dicle, showed it to the assembly claiming that it was the flag of the separatists. With the addition of some other members, two groups pushed one another. Dicle and Zana retook their oaths but they did not apologize from the parliament. Tercüman (Istanbul daily), November 7-8-9, 1991.
7. Tercüman, November 3, 1991, p. 12.
8. Cumhuriyet (Istanbul daily), August 9, 1992, p. 16.
9. Ayvaz Gökdemir, "Milli Kimlik Meseleleri", Tercüman, July 23, 1991, p. 10. Gökdemir is a TPP parliament member and he is famous for his initiatives that opposed SDPP's leftist

political aims; he is the leader of the conservatives within the TPP.

10. Gökdemir, "Milli Kimlik Meseleleri", p. 10.
11. Coşkun Kırca is a retired ambassador and writer for Milliyet, (Istanbul daily). Many predicted that he would be the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is now a prominent member of the conservative opposition within the party.
12. Coşkun Kırca, Milliyet, August 3, 1992, p. 10.
13. Gökdemir, "Milli Kimlik Meseleleri", p. 10.
14. Tercüman, December 9, 1991, p. 11.
15. Süleyman Demirel, Tercüman, December 9, 1991, p. 11.
16. İsmet Sezgin (the Minister of Internal Affairs), Tercüman, December 13, 1991, p. 11.
17. Tercüman, December 9, 1991, p. 11.
18. Former mayor from the MP of İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality of MP, and the former leader of the Democratic Center Party, which later joined the TPP.
19. Tercüman, September 22, 1991, p. 12.
20. Doğru Yol Partisi Tüzüğü, Ankara, 1983, p. 8.
21. Ibid., Article 2, p. 10.
22. Ibid., Article 4, p. 12.
23. Doğru Yol Partisi Seçim Bildirgesi, Ankara, 1992, the short text, p. 121.
24. Ibid., p. 129.
25. Tercüman, December 13, 1991, p. 11.
26. Tercüman, December 25, 1991, p. 9.
27. Tercüman, November 3, 1991, p. 12.

28. Hürriyet (Istanbul daily), May 19, 1992, p. 15.
29. Gökdemir, "Milli Kimlik Meseleleri", Tercüman, July 20, 1992, p. 10.
30. Ibid. , p.10.
31. Tercüman, November 3, 1991, p. 12.
32. See Coşkun Kırca's views in Aktüel, 13 (3-9 October 1991), p. 34.
33. Doğru Yol Partisi Seçim Bildirgesi, p. 12.
34. Tercüman, September 22, 1991, p. 12.
35. Tercüman, December 14, 1991, p. 9.
36. Tercüman, December 13, 1991, p. 11.
37. Doğru Yol Partisi Seçim Bildirgesi, pp. 112-4.
38. Ibid. , p. 12.
39. Hasan Cemal, Sabah (Istanbul daily), April 9, 1992, p. 17.
40. Tercüman, December 13, 1991, p. 11.
41. Tercüman, December 9, 1991, p. 11.
42. Tercüman, December 9, 1991, p. 11.

Chapter Five

CONCLUSION

Like in all other developing countries, political elite in Turkey shape the political discourse and the policies necessary to attain the political objectives. They also shape the society. As a matter of fact, the society is in a situation of being a passive receiver of policies. In Turkey the rights are granted from above and not obtained by those below.

The elite's conception of nationalism is thus crucial. Disappointed by the dismemberment of the empire that they ruled, the elite's conception of nationalism is influenced by a divisiveness anxiety that includes a feeling of xenophobia. To avoid the threats of division, the elite use nationalism to unify the people living in the country.

There is an overemphasis on cultural unity. The elite often oppress the opposing groups in society; although they use force only against violent opposition. Consequently people are alienated from the elite. With the multi-party politics, however, the elite realized that they should convince the masses rather than impose their policies.

These generalizations are valid for the TPP political elite, as well. They, too, use nationalism as an element of unity. They think that the territory, the nation, and the state had been in a process of disintegration, and that there is a need for a pluralist democracy to stop this deterioration. They recognized the Kurdish reality as a solution for the South East Problem and launched regional economic development projects. The TPP political elite do not look at the matter of outer Turks with an expansionist view. There is, however, an effort to foster cultural ties with them.

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